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A PLAN TO STRENGTHEN
THE PARIS CLIMATE AGREEMENT
Bryan H. Druzin*
INTRODUCTION
The Paris Agreement on climate change reached in December 2015 was a
historic achievement in international diplomacy.1 Nearly every nation in
the world—from North Korea to the United States—pledged to reduce their
greenhouse gas emissions to prevent a global rise in temperature beyond 1.5
degrees Celsius (2.7 degrees Fahrenheit).2 The scientific community is
telling us that a rise in the Earth’s temperature beyond 2 degrees Celsius
(3.6 degrees Fahrenheit) will yield catastrophic effects upon the planet’s
weather.3 The Paris Agreement—like all international agreements—stands,
however, upon the unstable foundations of mutual commitment and good
will. The agreement provides no consequences if countries do not meet
their commitments. Consensus of this kind is exceedingly fragile. Even a
trickle of nations exiting the agreement will, in all likelihood, trigger the
withdrawal of more governments, bringing about a total collapse of the
agreement. Environmental agreements are uniquely susceptible to this
pattern of failure—everyone needs to be onboard and stay onboard. At the
heart of the problem is what is known as the “tragedy of the commons”—a
unique dynamic that sabotages cooperation. On a domestic level, the
tragedy of the commons is easily solved through regulation. On a
supranational level, however, governance mechanisms tend to collapse.
Cooperation is crippled by the lack of a central authority with sufficient

* Assistant Professor and Deputy Director of LL.M. Programs, Faculty of Law, The Chinese
University of Hong Kong. Ph.D. in Law, King’s College London; LL.M., LL.B., B.A.,
University of British Columbia. I would like to thank Professor Douglas Kysar at Yale
University for his helpful feedback on an earlier draft of this Article. His expertise in the
area of environmental law and policy is deeply appreciated. The ideas outlined here form
the basis of a more expansive examination of the concept I am currently drafting.
1. Conference of the Parties, Adoption of the Paris Agreement, U.N. Doc.
FCCC/CP/2015/L.9/Rev.1 (Dec. 12, 2015).
2. Joby Warrick & Chris Mooney, 196 Countries Approve Historic Climate Agreement,
WASH. POST (Dec. 12, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-environment/wp
/2015/12/12/proposed-historic-climate-pact-nears-final-vote [http://perma.cc/43A2-62YM].
3. Thomas L. Friedman, Opinion, Paris Climate Accord Is a Big, Big Deal, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 16, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/16/opinion/paris-climate-accord-is-a-bigbig-deal.html [http:// perma.cc/5MTH-MLRY].
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coercive power to prevent countries from overexploiting shared resources—
our air, oceans, marine life, et cetera.
Sustainable use of common-pool resources is extremely tricky to
maintain. Indeed, the failure of the Kyoto Protocol is a stark testament to
this challenge.4 This short discussion offers a potential solution to this
crisis of coordination. This Article proposes a mechanism to mitigate the
impact of the tragedy of the commons and help ensure that the world’s
nations live up to their commitments under the Paris Agreement.5 The
challenge to international cooperation that the tragedy of the commons
creates is pernicious. The question of how to tackle the tragedy of the
commons—and I say this without a trace of exaggeration—is arguably the
most pressing problem we face as a species. We need a stable framework
for collective action now. The Paris Agreement offers our best hope yet for
rallying international cooperation. Yet a cloud of cynicism already
surrounds the agreement. After the collapse of Kyoto, a failure of the Paris
Agreement could fatally hobble global environmental governance.
I. WHAT IS THE TRAGEDY OF THE COMMONS?
In a tragedy of the commons, a group of actors behaving according to
rational self-interest undermines the entire group’s long-term interests by
depleting a common resource.6 The classic example is a group of farmers
overgrazing a common pasture until it can no longer be grazed.7 Because
each farmer wants to maximize their income by increasing the number of
their own cattle—a tempting option because the costs of doing so are
shared—the pasture becomes overstocked with cattle and quickly becomes
overgrazed. In this kind of situation, the problem is that no one can trust

4. Robert B. Semple Jr., Editorial, Remember Kyoto? Most Nations Don’t, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 3, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/04/opinion/sunday/remember-kyoto-mostnations-dont.html [http:// perma.cc/CS27-3X68]; see also Jeffrey Ball, Why the Paris
Climate Talks Won’t Amount to Much, WALL STREET J.: EXPERTS (Nov. 19, 2015, 10:06
AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/experts/2015/11/19/why-the-paris-climate-talks-wont-amount-tomuch [http:// perma.cc/R9G7-944L]; Lucas Bretschger & Eth Zurich, To Get a Climate
Agreement, First Set Out Principles for Fair Cost-Sharing, ECONOMIST (Nov. 20, 2015, 1:46
PM), http://www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2015/11/calculated-approach [http://
perma.cc/MN9R-MQP3].
5. The reader should note, however, that this approach in fact has a wide breadth of
application. Its usefulness extends far beyond the Paris Agreement and may be utilized to
reinforce any species of treaty. It could be used to reinforce existing, as well as future,
treaties of any kind. However, as explained below, this approach is especially suited to
solving a tragedy of the commons dynamic.
6. Although the concept can be traced back as far as Aristotle, the tragedy of the
commons was first formulated in a rigorous way by Garrett Hardin in the late 1960s. See
Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968). Hardin was not the
first to recognize the problem. See H. Scott Gordon, The Economic Theory of a Common
Property Resource: The Fishery, 62 J. POL. ECON. 124 (1954); Anthony Scott, The Fishery:
The Objectives of Sole Ownership, 63 J. POL. ECON. 116 (1955); see also ARISTOTLE,
POLITICS bk. II, at 1148 (Richard McKeon ed., Benjamin Jowett trans., Random House, Inc.
1941) (c. 350 B.C.E.) (“For that which is common to the greatest number has the least care
bestowed upon it.”).
7. See Hardin, supra note 6, at 1244.

20

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW RES GESTAE

[Vol. 84

that other group members will conserve the resource, which triggers a race
to the bottom—a race to deplete. The tragic irony is that even when
everyone wants to conserve the resource, players in this odd game of
distrust are driven by rational self-interest to deplete the common resource
to everyone’s disadvantage, including their own.8 In a tragedy of the
commons, everyone loses. Cooperation is extraordinarily difficult to
sustain—suspicion of just one “cheater” will cause cooperation to unravel.
The tragedy of the commons manifests with respect to a broad range of
common-pool resources. Clean air, forest and ocean management, and
desertification are but a few salient examples. Global warming, however, is
perhaps the ultimate example.
So what can be done? There are standard solutions to the tragedy of the
commons. These are: (a) top-down regulation: wherein third-party
enforcement coordinates the parties’ behavior through negating, with the
threat of sanctions, any incentive to cheat; (b) privatization: wherein the
externality of overexploitation is internalized to the resource owner, thereby
providing an incentive to preserve the resource; and (c) voluntary small
group cooperation: wherein, as the political economist Elinor Ostrom
demonstrated (for which she won a Nobel Prize), rules and institutions can
emerge to ensure shared management of resources in close-knit
communities.9
All these solutions, however, falter on an international level. Indeed, the
tragedy of the commons is uniquely malicious between state actors. The
first solution—top-down regulation—is extraordinarily difficult to achieve
because the global community is a fragmented jumble of legal authorities
that lacks a central authority with true coercive strength able to enforce
regulation. The second solution—privatization—is an unattractive option
for several reasons: (1) there are serious normative issues in creating
private monopolies over global resources, (2) it is often logistically
impossible to privatize global commons, (3) there is no guarantee that
private actors will have sufficiently long time horizons (indeed, these actors
may be publically listed companies legally obligated to maximize shortterm profits), and (4) the poor may be priced out of the resources and
underprivileged communities may be bypassed altogether in terms of access
to the resource. Finally, Ostrom’s approach is simply not viable on the
international level. By definition, it does not pertain to global actors. The
international community is the antithesis of a close-knit community able to
develop strong norms of conservation.10

8. In game theory, this cooperative dilemma can be modeled as a two-person Prisoner’s
Dilemma (PD). However, in a multiperson PD, the “game” typically becomes even more
unstable.
9. See ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS
FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION (1990) (arguing that common-pool problems may be solved by
voluntary organizations rather than by a coercive state or privatization).
10. Although, given a sufficiently high degree of repeated interaction, it is not
inconceivable that the international community may demonstrate some of the traits of a
small community.
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II. A PLAN TO SOLVE THE TRAGEDY OF THE COMMONS
In light of these deficiencies, this discussion proposes a solution. The
idea—the commons management fund deposit scheme (CMF)—would
work as follows: states would contribute an upfront “deposit” to an
international regulatory body with the understanding that part or all of their
contribution would be forfeited if they fail to honor their conservation
commitments. The goal of the scheme, however, is not to remedy particular
instances of noncompliance; rather, it is to stimulate a sufficient degree of
initial confidence in other parties’ level of commitment in order to prevent a
tragedy of the commons from emerging. The working assumption here is
that states want to comply. This is the reason why nations enter into
environmental agreements such as the Paris Agreement in the first place.
The problem is simply one of trust. The CMF is designed to build trust.
The CMF would be an international regulatory body that could be
established under the auspices of the United Nations. Any group of states
could register a treaty (i.e., the Paris Agreement) with the CMF, and the
deposit would be kept in reserve.11 This deposit would have to be large—
very large. The deposit with accrued interest would be returned to member
states after a specified period of time (i.e., the conclusion of the treaty). For
minor infractions, a deduction could be made. For major breaches, the
entire deposit would be forfeited (to the other parties in order to incentivize
monitoring). The CMF would create a regulatory body that would be
charged with investigating alleged breaches. To accommodate the disparity
in wealth between states, a percentage-based variant of the deposit scheme
based on gross domestic product (GDP) or other relevant metrics could be
designed. A percentage-based deposit would maintain its efficacy in that it
would signal the same degree of commitment (building trust). Such a
scheme has the benefit of remaining financially accessible to all states
regardless of the size of their economies. It could be left to the parties to
determine how large a deposit would be needed to signal commitment and
build trust as the parties themselves are best positioned to know how strong
of a commitment signal is required. The proposal here is that this
framework should be grafted onto the Paris Agreement to strengthen
compliance and avert the potential collapse of the accord.
III. WHY THIS PLAN IS UNIQUE
How does the CMF differ from other treaty compliance mechanisms?
The tragedy of the commons is a unique dynamic that calls for a unique
solution. This becomes immediately apparent when one understands why
most treaties fail. The usual problem for treaty compliance is that parties
may cheat if incentive structures change, so ex post (after the fact) punitive
measures are required to stop cheating. However, in the case of treaties

11. The CMF need not be limited to merely environmental agreements. However, the
focus here is on the tragedy of the commons, a problem that manifests starkly with respect to
conservation.
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exhibiting a tragedy of the commons dynamic, incentive structures may not
change at all; yet, simply due to a lack of trust, parties otherwise willing to
honor their commitments may still cheat. In a tragedy of the commons, the
mere fear of others cheating induces cheating. This is not the case with, for
example, a multilateral trade agreement (at least it is not the primary
problem). Such agreements are less vulnerable to perceptions and thus can
better withstand the blow of a party withdrawing from the agreement or
cheating. In a tragedy of the commons situation, because the primary
problem is one of trust, robust ex ante (before the fact) signaling can be
particularly effective in solving the dilemma.12 A sufficiently large deposit
achieves this, producing an initial burst of confidence that stabilizes the
agreement and keeps the tragedy of the commons at bay.
Ex post penalties are far weaker signals. This is because enforcement is
actually quite rare in multilateral environmental agreements.13 Actors can
simply withdraw from such agreements. In other cases, violations often go
unpunished because parties to the treaty do not wish to bear the costs of
enforcing the agreement.14 A tragedy of the commons is unique in that so
much turns on mere perception—the perception that others will not live up
to their commitments triggers a downward spiral into noncooperation. As
such, it makes more sense to “front-end” costs. This allows parties to signal
their commitment at a far more crucial stage, nudging perceptions in the
right direction and stymieing the emergence of a tragedy of the commons.15
CONCLUSION
The overall efficacy of the approach is difficult to predict. The only true
test of the scheme would come with actual implementation. What is not in
serious debate, however, is this: action on a massive scale needs to be
undertaken now to prevent further climate change. The stakes are high.
Now more than ever, a solution to the tragedy of the commons on a
supranational level is desperately needed. The international community
pulled off a remarkable feat of consensus in Paris. Now, however, comes
the challenge of keeping these commitments. We must now move quickly
12. I have written elsewhere on the usefulness of signaling in stabilizing cooperation.
See, e.g., Bryan Druzin, Opening the Machinery of Private Order: Public International Law
As a Form of Private Ordering, 58 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 423 (2014) (arguing that treaties that
require positive actions, as opposed to merely the absence of action, encourage compliance
because this allows for signaling); see also Bryan Druzin, Law, Selfishness, and Signals: An
Expansion of Posner’s Signaling Theory of Social Norms, 24 CAN. J. L. & JURIS. 5 (2011)
(arguing that the primary function of social norms is to signal cooperation).
13. See ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY:
COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 32–33 (1995).
14. Beth A. Simmons, International Law, in HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
352, 367 (Walter Carlsnaes et al. eds., 2d ed. 2013).
15. The CMF in fact mirrors strategies employed by commercial actors laboring under
similar conditions of distrust. Commercial parties desiring to collaborate where there is no
third party enforcement (or where such enforcement is unreliable or costly) often ask for
deeds of guarantee, deposits, or upfront investments in the form of heavy capital costs. The
CMF simply brings this same process to the supranational level of treaty compliance
between nations.
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to prevent the collapse of this fragile consensus by providing a mechanism
through which countries can clearly signal the seriousness of their
commitment to each other. Given the current legal and political
fragmentation of the world, meaningful action on climate change is a
formidable task. Nonetheless, it is critical that the tragedy of the commons
be brought to heel. The international community does not have the luxury
of waiting for the slow, natural advance of global governance. We must
accelerate this process through any means at our disposal if we are to halt
the climactic impact of over two hundred years of break-neck industrial
production.

